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Android's market experienced exponential popularity during the last few years. This
blazing growth has, unfortunately, opened the door to thousands of malicious applications
targeting Android devices everyday. Moreover, with the increasing sophistication of to-
day's malware, the use of traditional hashing techniques for Android malware ﬁnger-
printing becomes defenseless against polymorphic malicious applications. Inspired by
fuzzy hashing techniques, we propose, in this paper, a novel and comprehensive ﬁnger-
printing approach for Android packaging APK. The proposed ﬁngerprint captures, not only
the binary features of the APK ﬁle, but also the underlying structure of the app. Further-
more, we leverage this ﬁngerprinting technique to build ROAR, an automatic system for
Android malware detection and family attribution. Our experiments show that the pro-
posed ﬁngerprint and the ROAR system achieve a precision of 95%.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
In recent years, we have witnessed a phenomenal
popularity and growth of Android devices. It is estimated
that 2 billion devices are currently powered by Android OS
(Ericsson, 2013). This trend is expected to continue to
reach more than 5.6 billion devices by 2019 (Ericsson,
2013). Due to their proliferation and ubiquitousness,
Android devices have become a tempting target for cyber
criminals. According to a Cisco report (Cisco, 2014), mobile
malware mostly targets Android devices. In this setting,
the need to develop effective and accurate forensics
methods, techniques and tools for the detection and
analysis of Android malware becomes a desideratum.
To address the malware variation ﬂood, multiple
defence mechanisms have been proposed by the anti-mo-
bile-malware industry, with signature-based detection being
themost adopted technique. The latter usesmalware digest
or signature to match against mobile applications in order. Karbab).
vier Ltd. This is an open accto detect any malicious code. Traditional cryptographic
hashing algorithms such as SHA1 and MD5 have been
widely adopted for generating malware signatures. Cryp-
tographic hashing methods have the advantage of being
simple and fast. They are, however, highly sensitive to even
small changes, which makes these methods defenseless
against malware variations. Moreover, despite its effec-
tiveness, signature-based detection could be easily defea-
ted by new malicious applications with only tiny
modiﬁcations as is the case with polymorphic attacks.
To overcome the drawbacks of cryptographic hashing, a
new technique, namely fuzzy hashing, has emerged in the
literature. The concept of fuzzy hashing was ﬁrst intro-
duced as ssdeep (Kornblum, 2006) in rsync checksum
(Tridgell and Mackerras). The main advantage of this
technique over cryptographic hashing lies in its tolerance to
changes. Thanks to this important property, fuzzy hashing
has been widely leveraged to detect Web-based document
duplication (Figuerola et al., 2011). In cyber security, fuzzy
hashing has been mainly embraced in malware ﬁnger-
printing. For instance, Virus Total has been using the ssdeep
fuzzy hashing for malware ﬁngerprinting since 2012. Thereess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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et al., 2013), dcﬂdd (DCFL, 2016), sdhash (sdhash 2016;
Roussev), and mrshv2 (Breitinger and Baier, 2013), to
apply fuzzy hashing in multiple applications. In the context
of malware detection, it consists of two steps: i) malware
binary digest computation, ii) matching the digest against
other malware samples.
Despite its effectiveness compared to cryptographic
hashing, fuzzy hashing technique suffers from some lim-
itations. First, it ignores the underneath structure and
semantics of the malicious package. Second, fuzzy hashing
suffers from its single ﬁngerprint bounded with a
maximum size (e.g., ssdeep (Roussev, 2010)), thus pre-
venting packages with different sizes and features to be
effectively compared. Other drawbacks of fuzzy hashing
related to speciﬁc algorithms are presented in (Li et al.,
2015) concerning mvHash-B fuzzy hash algorithm
(Breitinger et al., 2013). Furthermore, the compressed
nature of Android APK package makes the repacking of
malicious apps an easy task. Moreover, the increasing
number of Android app stores and the lack of security
veriﬁcation in some stores increase the chance of attackers
to deploy malicious applications in multiple stores.
Another issue is related to native libraries (Wang and
Shieh, 2015), speciﬁcally at the level of Java objects,
executed on top of Dalvikmachine. It has been shown that
these libraries are exploited by a signiﬁcant number of
Android malware, such as the well-known sophisticated
DroidKungFu malware and its many variations (Zhou and
Jiang, 2012). Not analyzing the native library would
make the distinction between its variations a very chal-
lenging task.
Our objectives are to: i) Develop a more accurate, yet
broad, fuzzy ﬁngerprinting technique for Android OS mal-
ware. The proposed ﬁngerprint relies on a customized
fuzzy hashing technique that addresses the previous limi-
tations. ii) Design and implement a framework for Android
malware detection and family attribution on top of the
developed fuzzy ﬁngerprint. To this end, we propose APK-
DNA, a fuzzy ﬁngerprint that captures both the structure
and the semantics of the APK ﬁle using most Android APK
features. This ﬁngerprint covers: i) the underneath Android
app structure, including both Dalvik machine byte-code ii)
the meta-data of the Android app. Our empirical results
indicate that our ﬁngerprinting approach is highly robust to
app changes and accurate in terms of ﬁngerprint compu-
tation and matching.
Moreover, we build ROAR, an automatic framework for
Android malware detection, using the proposed APK-DNA.
The goal is to generate ﬁngerprints for known Android
malicious apps, and then detect new malware variations
using similarity computing. In ROAR framework, we pro-
pose two different approaches for malware detection: i)
family-ﬁngerprinting, and ii) peer-matching. In addition to
malware detection, we aim to attribute the family lineage
of the mobile malware. To this end, ROAR attributes a
similarity score to each possible variation in the same
malware family. We evaluate APK-DNA and ROAR using
real malware samples from the Android Malware Genome
Project (Android Malware Genome Project, 2015; Zhou
and Jiang, 2012). We experiment with multiple Androidmalware families. Our evaluation demonstrates that
ROAR is highly accurate compared to state of-the-art
approaches.
This paper makes the following contributions:
 We propose a novel and rather comprehensive ﬁnger-
printing technique for Android application packages
(APK) based on fuzzy hashing. The proposed ﬁngerprint
considers not only the binary format of APK but also its
structure and semantics.
 We design and implement ROAR, a framework that le-
verages the proposed ﬁngerprinting technique for
Android malware detection, following two different
approaches, namely peer-matching and family ﬁnger-
print. In addition, ROAR is able to detect malware vari-
ations and attribute the family of the detected malware.
 We evaluate ROAR on 928 Android malware samples
from (Android Malware Genome Project, 2015; Zhou
and Jiang, 2012) dataset. The evaluation results
demonstrate the high accuracy of ROAR in terms of both
malware detection and family attribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section Approach overview presents an overview of the
proposed approach. Section APK-DNA ﬁngerprint is dedi-
cated to the APK-DNA ﬁngerprinting. Section ROAR
framework presents the ROAR framework. Section
Experimental results details our experimental results.
Section Limitations and future work discusses the limita-
tions of the proposed approach together with some ideas
on future research. The related work is reported in Section
Related work. Section Conclusion contains some
concluding remarks.Approach Overview
Current fuzzy ﬁngerprints such as ssdeep are computed
against the app binary as a whole, which makes them
ineffective for detecting malicious app variations. This
problem gets even worst in case of Android OS because of
the structure of apps packaging, which contains not only
the actual compiled code but also other ﬁles such as media
ones. To overcome this limitation, we propose an effective
and broad fuzzy ﬁngerprint that captures, not only binary
features, but also the underneath structure and semantics
of the APK package.
Accordingly, our approach for computing Android app
ﬁngerprints relies on decomposing the actual APK ﬁle into
different content categories. For each category, we
compute a customized fuzzy hash (sub-ﬁngerprint). Note
that for some categories, for instance Dex ﬁle, the appli-
cation of the customized fuzzy hashing on the whole
category content does not capture the structure of the
underlying category. In this case, we apply fuzzy hashing
against a selected N-grams of the category content. In our
context, we use byte n-grams on binary ﬁles and instruction
n-grams on assembly ﬁles. Furthermore, a best practice for
malware ﬁngerprinting is to increase the entropy of the
app package content (Masud et al., 2007). To this end, we
compress each category content before computing the
APK-DNA Fuzzy Fingerprint
Meta-Data Assembly
Permissions Delvik Assembly
Binary
App Package
AcƟviƟes
Raw Binary Compressed
Dex Complied Code
Raw Binary Compressed
NaƟve Library
Raw Binary Compressed
Fig. 2. Android package ﬁngerprint structure.
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hashes (sub-ﬁngerprints) are then concatenated to pro-
duce the ﬁnal composed fuzzy ﬁngerprint, called APK-
DNA. As depicted in Fig. 1, there are two main processes.
First, we build a database of ﬁngerprints by generating the
APK-DNA for known malware samples. To identify
whether a new app is malicious or not, and to know its
family in case it is malicious, ﬁrst we compute its APK-DNA
and match it against the existing ﬁngerprints in the data-
base. Moreover, we use the proposed APK-DNA ﬁngerprint
as a basis to design and implement ROAR, a novel frame-
work for malware detection and family attribution. ROAR's
ﬁrst approach, namely family-ﬁngerprinting, computes a
ﬁngerprint for each malware family. Afterwards, it uses
these family ﬁngerprints to make security decisions on
new apps. In the second approach, peer-matching, ROAR
uses the whole ﬁngerprint database for detection and
attribution.APK-DNA ﬁngerprint
In this section, we present our approach for generating
Android apps ﬁngerprints. Before presenting the details of
the ﬁngerprint generation, it is necessary to understand the
structure of the Android APK package.Android APK format
Android application package (APK) is the ofﬁcial
Android packaging format that is used for apps distribution
and installation. By analogy, APK ﬁles are similar to EXE
installation ﬁles for Windows or RPM/DEB ﬁles for Linux.
More precisely, APK comes as a ZIP archive ﬁle, which
contains the different components of the Android App. APK
ﬁle content is organized into directories (namely lib, res,
and assets) and ﬁles (namely AndroidManifest.xml and
classes.dex). The purpose of each item is as follows: i)
AndroidManifest.xml carries the app meta-data, e.g.,
name, version, required permissions, and used libraries. ii)
The classes.dex contains the compiled classes of the Java
code. iii) The lib directory stores C/Cþþ native libraries
(NDK, 2016). iv) Finally, the resources directory contains
the non-source code ﬁles that are packaged into the APK ﬁle
during compilation. It mostly holds media ﬁles such as
video, image, and audio ﬁles.Fig. 1. ApproachAPK-DNA ﬁngerprint structure
We leverage the aforementioned APK structure to deﬁne
the most important components for ﬁngerprinting. The
design of the APK ﬁngerprint must consider most of its
important components as unique features to be able to
distinguish between different malware samples. As depic-
ted in Fig. 2, APK-DNA is composed of three main sub-
ﬁngerprints based on their content type: Metadata, Bi-
nary, and Assembly. The Metadata sub-ﬁngerprint con-
tains information, which is extracted from the
AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle. We particularly focus on the
required permissions. The aim is to ﬁngerprint the
permission used for a speciﬁc Android malware or malware
family. Our insight comes from the fact that some Android
malware samples need a speciﬁc type of permission to
conduct their malicious actions. For example, the malware
DroidKungFu1 (Zhou and Jiang, 2012) requires access to
personal data to steal sensitive information. Having
Android malware without access permissions to personal
data, e.g., phone number, would suggest that this malware is
most likely not part of DroidKungFu1 family. Other met-
adata information could be considered for malware segre-
gation, for instance, Activity list, Service list, and Component.
In our current design of APK-DNA, we focus on the required
access permissions.
The Binary sub-ﬁngerprint captures the binary repre-
sentation of the APK ﬁle content. In other words, we aim to
ﬁngerprint the byte sequence of Android malware. In this
context, we use n-grams (Masud et al., 2007) as we will
present in Section APK-DNA ﬁngerprint generation. We
divide the binary sub-ﬁngerprint into three parts: App
Package, Dex Compiled Code, andNative Library. The App
Package consists of the APK ﬁle. Thus, all the components
inside the package are considered (e.g., media ﬁle). Along
with the raw APK package, we apply a compression schemaoverview.
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In the Dex Compiled Code, we focus on the code section of
the Android malware, which is located in the classes.dex ﬁle
of Android apps. The use of the code section for malware
detection has proven its accuracy (Jang and Brumley, 2011).
In the context of Android malware, we use extracted fea-
tures from the classes.dex as part of the APK-DNA. In addi-
tion, we use a high-entropy version of the classes.dex for
ﬁngerprinting by applying the compression. The Native
Library part of the binary sub-ﬁngerprint captures C/Cþþ
shared libraries, used by malware. Using the native library
for malware ﬁngerprinting is essential in some cases, for
example, to distinguish between two Android malware
samples. For instance, if themalware uses a native library, it
is more likely to be DroidKungFu2 than DroidKungFu1
becauseDroidKungFu2malware family uses C/Cþþ library
and DroidKungFu1 uses only Java byte code.
In the Assembly sub-ﬁngerprint, we focus also on the
code section of the Android malware, which is classes.dex.
However, we do not consider the binary format. Instead,
we use the reverse-engineered assembly code. As we will
present in Section N-grams, we reverse engineered the
Dalvik byte-code in order to extract instruction sequences
used in the app. The Assembly sub-ﬁngerprint aims to
distinguish malware using the unique instruction se-
quences in the assembly ﬁle. We use the same technique
as in the Binary sub-ﬁngerprint, i.e., n-grams. However,
here we consider the assembly instructions instead of
bytes. In addition to assembly instructions, we could also
consider section names, call graph, etc. In the current
design, we focus on the assembly instructions for
ﬁngerprinting.
APK-DNA ﬁngerprint generation
In this section, we present the computation steps for
generating the APK-DNA ﬁngerprint. In addition, we pre-
sent the main techniques adopted in the design of the
ﬁngerprint, namely, N-gram and Feature Hashing.
N-grams
The N-gram technique is used for computing contiguous
sequences of N items from a large sequence. For our pur-
pose, we use N-grams to extract the sequences used by
Android malware to be able to distinguish between
different malware samples. To increase the ﬁngerprint ac-
curacy, we leverage two types of N-grams, namely in-
struction N-grams and bytes N-grams. As depicted in Fig. 4,
the instruction N-grams are the unique sequences in the
disassembly of classes.dex ﬁle, where the instructions are
stripped from the parameters. In addition to instruction N-
grams, we also use byte N-grams on different contents of
the Android package. Fig. 4 illustrates different N-grams on
both instructions and bytes of the ﬁrst portion of the
AnserverBot malware. We have experimented multiple
options such as Bigrams, 3-g, and 5-g. The latter showed the
best results in the design of APK-DNA ﬁngerprint, as wewill
see in the evaluation section. The result of N-grams
extraction is the list of unique 5-g for each content category,
i.e., assembly instructions, classes.dex, native library, and APK
ﬁle.Feature hashing
Feature hashing is a machine learning preprocessing
technique for compacting an arbitrary number of features
into a ﬁxed-size feature vector. The feature hashing algo-
rithm, described in Algorithm 1, takes as input the set of
sequences generated by applying the N-grams technique
and the target length of the feature vector. In the current
implementation of APK-DNA, we use a bit feature vector of
16 KB but the size could be adjusted according to the
needed density of the bit-feature vector to distinguish be-
tween apps. For example, the size of the assembly in-
struction vector could be less than the dex vector since the
density produced by the instruction content is less than the
dex one. Notice that in our implementation, we store only a
binary value, which deﬁnes whether the N-gram exists or
not. The standard feature hashing uses the frequency, i.e.,
the number of occurrences of a given N-gram. The output of
the feature hashing algorithm is a feature-bit vector.
Instead of using existing fuzzy hashing algorithms such as
ssdeep, we leverage the feature vector as our fuzzy hashing
technique for implementing APK-DNA ﬁngerprint. In the
next section, we present the complete process of
computing the ﬁngerprint by using N-grams and feature
hashing as basic blocks.
Fingerprint computation process
As shown in Fig. 3, the ﬁngerprint computation process
starts by decomposing the Android app APK ﬁle into four
different content categories: 1) Dalvik byte-code, 2) APK
ﬁle, 3) native libraries, and 4) AndroidManifest ﬁle. Each
binary content is compressed to increase the entropy. Af-
terwards, we extract the bytes N-grams from the raw and
the compressed content. The resulting N-grams set is
provided as input to the feature hashing function to pro-
duce the customized fuzzy hashing. The size of each
customized fuzzy hash is 16 KB as mentioned in Section
Feature hashing. For Dalvik byte-code, we ﬁngerprint the
assembly code in addition to the binary ﬁngerprint. First,
we reverse engineer the classes.dex ﬁle to produce its as-
sembly code. After prepossessing the assembly, we use the
instruction sequence of the Android app to extract the
instruction N-grams set. Afterwards, we use feature
hashing to generate a 16 KB bit vector ﬁngerprint for the
assembly code. The current design of APK-DNA uses the
feature hashing techniquewithout feature selection because
we aim to keep the maximum information on the targeted
malware instance or its family. However, feature selection
could be a promising technique to explore in future APK-
DNA design.
Fig. 3. APK-DNA computation process.
Fig. 4. First instructions and bytes of AnserverBot malware.
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into a readable format, then parse it to extract the required
permissions by the Android app. To use the required
permission app ﬁngerprinting, we use a bit vector of all
Android permissions in a predeﬁned order. For a given
required permission, we ﬂag the bit to 1 in the permission
vector if it exists in the AndroidManifest ﬁle. The result is a
bit vector for all the permissions of the Android app. At the
end of the aforementioned operations, we generate ﬁve bit
vectors. The ﬁnal step of the fuzzy ﬁngerprint computation
consists of concatenating all the produced digests into one
ﬁngerprint, designated as APK-DNA. It is important to
mention that, for the purpose of similarity computation, we
also keep track of the bits of each content vector. Notice
that the content categories are mandatory for Android apps
except the native library, which may not be part of the app.
Therefore, we use a bit vector of zeros for the feature vectorof the native library. The ﬁnal size of APK-DNA is 16 KB for
the feature vector of each content (there are 4 feature
vectors: assembly, byte-code, APK, and native library).
However, for the permission vectors, we use a 256-bit
feature vector since Android permission system does not
exceed this number.
Fingerprint similarity computation
The main reason of adopting the feature vector as a
customized fuzzy hash is to make the similarity compu-
tation straightforward by using Jaccard Similarity, as
shown in Equation (1). Since in our case, we have a set of
bit feature vectors ﬂagging the existence of a feature, we
adopt bitwise jaccard similarity, as depicted in Equation
(2).
JaccardðX;YÞ ¼ jX∩Y jjX∪Y j
0  JaccardðX;YÞ  1
(1)
Jaccard bitwiseðA;BÞ ¼ OnesðA$BÞ
OnesðAþ BÞ
0  Jaccard bitwiseðX; YÞ  1
(2)
Let A and B be two bit-feature vectors, the union of the
two vectors is given by the logical expression Aþ B and its
cardinality is the number of “1” bits in the resulting vector.
Similarly, the cardinality of the intersection of the two
vectors is the number of “1” bits in A$B bit vector. A com-
plete example of similarity computation using bit-wise
Jaccard similarity is shown in Fig. 5. As presented in Sec-
tion Fingerprint computation process, APK-DNA fuzzy
ﬁngerprint is composed of ﬁve fuzzy hashes, which are bit-
feature vectors. To compute the similarity between two
A = 1011 0110 1001 0001
B = 0011 1010 1001 0000
A+B = 1011 1110 1001 0001
A.B = 0011 0010 1001 0000
Jaccard(A,B) =5 / 9
Ones(A+B) = 9
Ones(A.B) = 5
Fig. 5. Bitwise jaccard similarity computation.
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between the bit feature vectors representing the same
content. In other words, we calculate the similarity be-
tween the feature vectors of the assembly, byte-code, APK,
native library, and permissions. The result is a set of ﬁve
similarity values.
ROAR framework
In this section, we leverage the proposed APK-DNA
ﬁngerprint for Android malware detection. More pre-
cisely, we present i) family-ﬁngerprinting approach, where
we deﬁne and use a family ﬁngerprint, and ii) peers-
matching approach, where we compute the similarity be-
tween malware ﬁngerprints. Both approaches are based on
peer-ﬁngerprint-voting mechanism to make a decision
about malware detection and family attribution, as we
present in the next sub-section.
Peer ﬁngerprint voting technique
As we have seen in Section Fingerprint similarity
computation, comparing two Android malware packages
consists of computing similarities between their Metadata,
Binary and Assembly sub-ﬁngerprints, which gives nu-
merical values on how the two packages are similar in a
speciﬁc content category, as presented in Algorithm 2. In
addition, we add the summation of all the similarities as a
summary value of these sub-contents similarities. Note that
other summary values such as the average and the
maximum could also be used.However, it is unclear how to detect the most similar
packages if we compare an unknown package to known
malware packages using multiple sub-ﬁngerprints. The
most obvious solution is to merge the bit-vectors of each
content category into one vector, and then compute the
similarity of the resulting feature vector. However, in our
case, merging the bit vectors will heavily reduce the
contribution of some sub-ﬁngerprints in the similarity
computation. This is especially the case for the metadata
sub-ﬁngerprint, since the number of bits of the metadata
feature vector is very small compared with the assembly
ones. Similarly, the density of the assembly feature vector is
considerably less than the binary one. Consequently, we
propose to use a composed similarity using the peer-
ﬁngerprint voting technique. The idea is to compare be-
tween the parts (sub-ﬁngerprints) instead of comparing
the whole ﬁngerprints, as depicted in Algorithm 3. In other
words, we compare each sub-similarity pairs. The decision
is made by a voting mechanism on the result of each sub-
comparison. Moreover, in case of equal votes, we
compare the summation of the sub-similarities to remove
the decision ambiguity. At this stage, we are able to
compare different Android packages and make a decision
on themost similar package to a given one. Inwhat follows,
we propose two approaches to malware detection.
Peer matching approach
In the peer-matching approach, ROAR uses the most
straightforward technique to detect malware, i.e., query the
ﬁngerprints database to ﬁnd the most similar ﬁngerprint.
To detect Android malware variation, we build a malware
ﬁngerprints database by computing APK-DNA for known
Android malware. As shown in Fig. 6, for each new mal-
ware, we compute its APK-DNA and add it to the database.
To attribute the malware family to a new app, we ﬁrst
compute the similarity between the malware ﬁngerprint
and each entry in the database of known malware ﬁnger-
prints, as depicted in Fig. 6. To this end, we use the bitwise
Jaccard similarity, presented in Section Fingerprint
similarity computation, to produce a set of sub-similarity
values, i.e., composed similarity. Afterwards, to compare
Fig. 6. Malware detection using peer-matching approach.
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presented peer-voting technique. The entry with the high-
est similarity, in case it exceeds a threshold, determines the
malware family. In the current implementation, we use a
static threshold. Peer-matching is a simple approach for
malware detection and family attribution. However, this
simplicity comes with a cost, as we will discuss in Section
Discussion.
Family-ﬁngerprinting approach
In this approach, some extra steps are needed to build a
second database for family ﬁngerprints. The target is to
reduce the number of database entries needed to compare
with in order to ﬁngerprint an Androidmalware (see Fig. 7).
For this reason, we propose a fuzzy hashing ﬁngerprint for
a malware family. The aim is to leverage this family
ﬁngerprint for malware detection. The idea is to build aFig. 7. Malware detection using fadatabase of family ﬁngerprints from known Android mal-
ware samples, and use this database for similarity
computation for unknownmalware apps. The actual size of
the family-ﬁngerprints database is limited by the number
of malware families. Notice that the ﬁngerprint structure
for a malware family is the same as for a single malware,
i.e., metadata, binary, and assembly family sub-
ﬁngerprints.mily-ﬁngerprint approach.
Table 1
Evaluation Malware dataset.
# Malware Family/Apps Number of samples
0 AnserverBot 187
1 KMin 52
2 DroidKungFu4 96
3 GoldDream 47
4 Geinimi 69
5 BaseBridge 122
6 DroidDreamLight 46
7 DroidKungFu3 309
8 Benign Apps 100
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ﬁngerprint based on the underlying content sub-
ﬁngerprints. First, the ﬁngerprint is initialized to zeros
(each content sub-ﬁngerprint). Afterwards, the ﬁngerprint
is generated by implying the logical OR of the current value
of the family ﬁngerprint with a single malware ﬁngerprint.
Note that each content sub-ﬁngerprint is computed sepa-
rately. This operation is applied on all malware samples in
the database. After computing the ﬁngerprints from known
malware samples, we store them in a family-ﬁngerprints
database, which is used for detection and family attribu-
tion. The detection process is composed of several steps.
First, for a given Android package, we generate its ﬁnger-
print as described in Section Fingerprint similarity
computation. Then, we compute the similarity between
this ﬁngerprint and each family ﬁngerprint in the database.
The family with the highest similarity score will be chosen
as the family of the new app if the similarity value is above
a deﬁned threshold. In the current implementation, we use
a static threshold, which is only applied on the summation
part of the composed similarity.
Experimental results
In this section, we start by describing ROAR imple-
mentation and the testing setup, including the dataset and
the accuracy measurement techniques. Afterwards, we
present the achieved results in terms of accuracy for both
approaches that are adopted in ROAR framework, namely
family-ﬁngerprinting and peer-matching.
Implementation
Both ROAR approaches, namely family-ﬁngerprinting
and peer-matching, have been implemented and evalu-
ated separately. We implemented ROAR using Python
programming language and bash command line tools. As
mentioned in Section APK-DNA ﬁngerprint generation,
we compress the content of the packages to increase the
entropy. In the current implementation, Gzip compres-
sion tools have been chosen. For generating binary N-
grams, we used xxd tool to convert the package content
into a sequence of bytes. In addition, we use a set of
command tools such as awk and grep to ﬁlter the results.
Regarding reverse engineering of the Dex byte-code, we
use dexdump, a tool that comes with Android SDK. The
generated assembly is ﬁltered using the common Unix
tools. To extract the permission from AndroidManifest.xml,
we ﬁrst convert the binary XML to a readable format
using aapt, a tool provided by Android SDK. Then, we
parse the produced XML using standard Python XML
parsing library.
Testing setup
Our dataset contains 928 malware samples from
Android Malware Genome Project (Zhou and Jiang, 2012;
Android Malware Genome Project, 2015). For the pur-
pose of evaluation, we selected malware families with
many samples since some malware families in AndroidMalware Genome Project (Android Malware Genome
Project, 2015) contain only few samples (some families
have only one sample), as depicted in Table 1. Clearly, by
ﬁltering out other families that do not have enough mal-
ware samples, we may miss the detection of these mal-
ware families. In our experiments, we particularly target
malware variations, where the adversary repacks the
original malware into different packages in order to
deceive the mobile anti-malware and the evaluation pro-
cess of Android app stores. For the purpose of evaluation,
we decide to have the same size for each malware family
so that all families will be equally represented in the ﬁn-
gerprints database. Having a balanced malware dataset is
important for the evaluation of the family-ﬁngerprinting
approach since an unbalanced dataset could cause unbal-
anced density in the generated family APK-DNA. This
choice has affected the detection and malware family
attribution results. As such, in each iteration of the eval-
uation, we randomly sample 46 Android malware from the
top families (any family with population greater than 46)
in the dataset (Android Malware Genome Project, 2015)
(DroidDreamLight family has the least malware in our
testing dataset with 46 samples).
For each evaluation benchmark and from the balanced
dataset, we randomly sample 70% of each family from the
dataset to build the ﬁngerprints database. The rest of the
dataset (30%) is used for the evaluation of ROAR ap-
proaches and sub-ﬁngerprints. Notice that the random
sampling is done for every benchmark evaluation.
Accordingly, we repeat the evaluation three times. The
ﬁnal result is the average of the three evaluation results. In
addition to the known malware samples, we use benign
Android applications in each evaluation. These apps have
been downloaded from Google play pseudo-randomly
without considering the popularity of the app, as shown
in Table 1. For each evaluation, we randomly sample
benign apps and include them in the testing. For each
benchmark, we measure the number of true positives (TP),
false negatives (FN), and false positives (FP) and compute
the confusion matrix. Afterwards, we summarize the re-
sults by computing the general precision and recall using
the formulas in Equations (3) and (4). Note that the highest
the precision is, the fewer false positives we get in the
matching. On the other hand, the highest the recall is, the
fewer are the false negative results. The ideal result should
have both high precision and high recall. To this end, the
F1-Score is generally used to have the advantages of both
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Formula 5, the F1-score is the harmonic mean of the pre-
cision and the recall. In addition, we compute the confusion
matrix in the benchmark to determine the false negatives
(FN) and false positives for a speciﬁc family.
Prescision ¼ TP
TP þ FP (3)
Recall ¼ TP
TP þ FN (4)
F1 Score ¼ 2 Precision Recall
Prescisionþ Recall (5)
ROAR evaluation results
In this section, we present the evaluation results of
ROAR framework. Each approach has been separately
evaluated. The results are presented using F1-Score, Pre-
cision and Recall. The approach has been evaluated multi-
ple times using different ﬁngerprint setups, i.e.,
combinations of sub-ﬁngerprints, which are used to
compute the similarities using peer-voting technique.
Furthermore, we present a comparison between the pro-
posed peer-voting similarity technique and a merged
ﬁngerprint similarity.
Confusion matrix description
In addition to the previous evaluation metrics, we also
use the confusion matrices in each evaluation, as shown in
Figs. 8 and 9. Each confusionmatrix is a square table, where
the number of rows and columns are respectively the
malware families and the benign apps following the same
order as in Table 1. The columns and rows from 0 to 7 are
respectively the malware families, AnserverBot, KMin,
DroidKungFu4, GoldDream, Geinimi, BaseBridge, Droid-
DreamLight, and DroidKungFu3, and the column and row
8 represent the benign apps. The interpretation of the
confusion matrix results is related to the intensity of the
color in its diagonal. The more the color is solid in the di-
agonal, the higher and the more accurate are the results of
the evaluation (true positive). The intensity of the color of a
given cell in the confusion matrix represents the number of
the malware/apps that have been assigned to this cell ac-
cording to the color bar. However, the less solid is the color
in the diagonal and themore solid in the other cells, the less
accurate is the result.
False negative
For any row from 0 to 7 (i.e., malware family), there is a
missed malware family attribution if we have a gray color
in the other cells of the same row. Even though we missed
the family attribution, we still detect the maliciousness of
the app. However, a gray cell in column 8 (benign apps)
means that we missed both the detection and the family
attribution (detection false negative).False positive
In the benign apps row (row number 8), a gray color in
the malware cells indicates that there is a false positive. In
other words, there are benign apps that have been detected
as malicious. The number of false positives could be
measured using the intensity of the color according to the
color bar.
Family-ﬁngerprinting results
As depicted in Table 2, the F1-score, precision, and
recall of the family-ﬁngerprinting approach vary according
to the ﬁngerprint setup. We evaluated the approach for
each content type separately, i.e., assembly, permission, and
dex ﬁles, so that we can clearly see the impact of each
component in the ﬁnal ﬁngerprint. Both assembly and
permission types have shown more accurate results
compared to dex type. Speciﬁcally, the permission has
shown a very promising result, as shown in Table 2. This
supports the impact of the metadata in Android malware
detection. We believe that investigating other metadata
could result in a higher accuracy. Another surprising result
is APK, which has shown a poor accuracy value (under
40%). The learned lesson is that applying the fuzzy
ﬁngerprinting (including ssdeep) in the whole package
could deceive the malware investigation using fuzzy
matching. The confusion matrix for each setup shows a
more granular view of the result, as shown in Fig. 8, where
the indexes are the malware families (Table 1). On the
other hand, the combination setups have shown accurate
results for most combinations. We depict three sub-
ﬁngerprints, which correspond to the best results. Note
that the setup composed of assembly, permission, and dex
byte-code shows the highest F1-Score.
Peer-matching results
The peer-matching approach shows a higher F1-score,
precision, and recall for all the setups compared to the
family-ﬁngerprinting one, as shown in Table 3. This can be
clearly seen in the confusion matrices in Fig. 9. In contrast
with the previous results, the dex byte-code shows a higher
precision than assembly and permission, but it is still lower
in both recall and F1-score. The setup combination (as-
sembly, permission) has the highest accuracy in the peer-
matching approach. As such, by using only two content
categories, metadata permission and assembly instruction
sequences, we achieved a very promising detection rate,
especially that the computation of these sub-ﬁngerprints is
light and simple compared to state-of-the-art ﬁngerprint
hashing techniques.
Peer-voting vs merged ﬁngerprints
As presented in Section Peer ﬁngerprint voting
technique, the most obvious technique to deal with mul-
tiple sub-ﬁngerprints is to merge all of them (merged
ﬁngerprint). However, we propose peer-voting technique to
compare between multiple sub-ﬁngerprints. To test the
proposed technique, we evaluate it against the merged
ﬁngerprint for the same ﬁngerprint setup. As shown in Table
4, the peer-voting technique has shown a higher accuracy
than the merging one. A more clear view of the result can
be seen in the confusion matrix in Fig. 10.
Fig. 8. Confusion Matrices of Family-Fingerprint Approach for each Fingerprint Setup.
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Similarity computation based on family-ﬁngerprinting
approach is bounded by the number of families, which is a
way less than the number of malware samples. Conse-
quently, this approach is more scalable compared to the
peer-matching one. However, the family-ﬁngerprinting
approach suffers from twomain drawbacks. First, its design
is more complex compared to peer-matching since it re-
quires an extra step to build the family-ﬁngerprint data-
base, even though we do not build the database for every
new matching. Second, because of the rapid change of the
malware database, we constantly need to update the
family-ﬁngerprint database with the new malware ﬁnger-
print features. On the contrary, the peer-matching approach
does not require an update since the new malware ﬁnger-
print is directly inserted. Regarding the peer-matching
approach, it mainly suffers from scalability issues since for
each new malware, all the entries in the database need to
be matched. Therefore, the query latency is related to the
number of malware ﬁngerprints in the database. However,
in terms of accuracy, the peer-matching approach performs
better than the family ﬁngerprinting one. Concerning APK-
DNA ﬁngerprint, the average computation of APK-DNA is
15 s with medium size APK using only one core of the CPU.
Finally, regarding the detection threshold, we used a ﬁxed
threshold to decide between malicious and benign apps
based on our experimental results. Once an app is detectedas malicious, it is assigned to the malware class with the
highest similarity.
Limitations and future work
With the current implementation of ROAR and its
ﬁngerprinting technique, we cannot detect new Android
malware since our main goal is to detect variations of
known malware. Naturally, if the adversary needs to
develop new malware or use very sophisticated repacking
techniques, this malware might not be ﬂagged. However,
this will dramatically increase the cost for the attacker to
repack known malware. Moreover, as presented in Section
Discussion, the latency of the peer-matching approach is
higher compared to the family-ﬁngerprinting approach, and
it linearly increases with the number of ﬁngerprints in the
database. Furthermore, in the current implementation of
the proposed ﬁngerprint, we did not include the native li-
brary, a part of the binary sub-ﬁngerprint. We plan to
consider the native code ﬁngerprint in future work, where
we focus on Android malware that uses C/Cþþ native code.
Related work
Signature-based malware detection
Li et al., (2015) evaluated the effectiveness of fuzzy
hashing for clustering malware and proposed a new block-
Fig. 9. Confusion Matrices of Peer-Matching Approach for each Fingerprint Setup.
Table 2
Accuracy results of the family-ﬁngerprinting approach (The best ﬁnger-
print setup is in bold).
Fingerprint setup F1-Score Precision Recall
Assembly 69% 88% 68%
APK 33% 36% 32%
Permission 69% 84% 70%
Dex 41% 46% 43%
Assembly, Permission, Dex, APK 81% 88% 80%
Assembly, Permission 82% 88% 81%
Assembly, Permission, Dex 85% 89% 84%
Best Fingerprint Setup 85% 89% 84%
Table 3
Accuracy result of peer-matching approach (The best ﬁngerprint setup is
in bold).
Fingerprint setup F1-Score Precision Recall
Assembly 91% 91% 90%
Apk 46% 48% 44%
Permission 81% 82% 80%
Dex 80% 90% 84%
Assembly, Permission, Dex, APK 84% 91% 81%
Assembly, Permission, Dex 93% 94% 93%
Assembly, Permission 94% 95% 94%
Best Fingerprint Setup 94% 95% 94%
Table 4
Accuracy result of ROAR using merged ﬁngerprint (The best ﬁngerprint
setup is in bold).
Fingerprint setup F1-Score Precision Recall
Merged in Family-Approach 72% 84% 72%
Peer-Voting in Family-Approach 85% 89% 84%
Merged in Peer-Approach 86% 87% 86%
Peer-Voting in Peer-Approach 94% 95% 94%
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et al., 2012a) generates app-speciﬁc ﬁngerprints to detect
app modiﬁcations and computes similarity scores using
edit distance. Crussell et al., (2013) proposed a system
based on min-hashing and LSH techniques to improve the
matching time. Hanna et al., (2012) proposed the use of
Delvik VM assembly op-codes to compute a list of features
and the similarity between inputted apps. Juxtapp (Hanna
et al., 2013) uses feature hashing on the opcode sequence
to determine if an app is malicious, contains copies of
buggy or plagiarized code. Nayak et al., (2014) proposed a
fuzzy approach to classify Android malware into: root
exploit, information steal, premium SMS, trojan, and
benign. Other signature-based contributions (Faruki et al.,
2013, 2015; Ali-Gombe et al., 2015; Lindorfer et al., 2014a;
Fig. 10. Confusion matrices of ROAR approaches using merged ﬁngerprint.
E.B. Karbab et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S33eS45S44Feng et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2012b, 2013; Chen et al., 2015)
have been proposed using different approaches. Most of
these solutions consider only one content category of APK,
for example, Juxtapp focuses on the assembly extracted
from the DEX byte-code, (Crussell et al., 2013) considers
malware's code section, (Ali-Gombe et al., 2015) is limited to
classes.dex ﬁle, and (Crussell et al., 2013) does not consider
third-party libraries. In contrast, our solution considers
multiple content categories as well as the metadata, which
allows APK-DNA to have much coverage on the static
characteristics of the malicious apps.
Runtime-based malware detection
Vidas and al (Vidas and Christin, 2014; Vidas et al., 2014)
explored various emulator anddynamic analysis techniques
for Android systems based on differences in behavior, per-
formance, components and system design. ANDRUBIS
(Lindorfer et al., 2014b) analyzed over 1,000,000 Android
apps based on extracted features and observed behaviors
during runtime. Among many other runtime-based contri-
butions, we can cite (Rastogi et al., 2013; Yan and Yin, 2012;
Spreitzenbarth et al., 2015; Enck et al., 2014; Zhang et al.,
2013; Zhang and Yin, 2014). Researchers in Ref. (Sufatrio
et al., 2015) highlighted some of the challenges faced by
dynamic analysis techniques on Android apps, such as, the
need to simulate system events and the user's GUI re-
sponses, time limit on how an app can be executed and
observed, detection of the presence of Android virtualiza-
tion or emulation systems by malicious applications, in
addition to scalability requirements of such detection sys-
tems to evaluate an enormous amount of available apps.
Android malware classiﬁcation
Peng et al., (2012) proposed a classiﬁcation and proba-
bilistic models for ranking risks for Android apps. DroidSIFT
(Zhanget al., 2014) is a semantic-based systemthat classiﬁes
Androidmalware using dependency graphs. DroidAPIMiner
(Aafer et al., 2013) extracts Android malware features at the
API level and provides robust and light classiﬁers tomitigatemalware installations. Drebin (Arp et al., 2014) detects ma-
licious applications based on Android permissions and
sensitive APIs. The main difference with our work is that
most existing approaches are based on machine learning
techniques to generate models for malware detection and
attribution. In contrast, we generate fuzzy ﬁngerprints toﬁll
the gap of existing signature techniques, such as MD5,
ssdeep, etc. Our technique could be used in complementary
to existing machine learning solutions where APK-DNA
could be used as a ﬁrst ﬁltration phase.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive fuzzy
ﬁngerprinting approach for investigating Android malware
variations. To this end, we have proposed APK-DNA, a novel
ﬁngerprint that captures not only the binary of the APK ﬁle,
but also both its structure and semantics. This is of para-
mount importance since it allowed the proposed ﬁnger-
print to be highly resistant to app changes, which is a
signiﬁcant advantage compared to traditional fuzzy hash-
ing techniques. Moreover, we have leveraged the proposed
APK-DNA ﬁngerprint to design and implement a novel
framework for Android malware detection, following two
different approaches, namely family-ﬁngerprinting and
peer-matching. In addition to detecting malware variations,
ROAR framework is also able to attribute the family of the
detected malware. The evaluation of ROAR demonstrated
very promising results, with high accuracy in terms of both
malware detection and family attribution.Acknowledgments
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